

TPR 5.2.2 Level Crossing Risks

Introduction and Context

This document is intended to contextualise and evidence the decision taken by Network Rail to publish Level Crossing Risk in TPR V4, as per the established position in V3.

Following TTP2687 and TTP2690, the CRC chair raised with Network Rail the issue of inconsistent and unclear information being included in Section 5.2.2 of the Timetable Planning Rules (TPRs), “General Capacity Restraints”. TTP2687 meant NR could not sufficiently or satisfactorily demonstrate the performance stance taken, and TTP2690 noted NR could choose to pursue formal firebreaks in TPRs.

An OPSG subgroup was created to discuss these issues and advise on a way forward. The outcome of this was a recommendation that a clearer, more consistent structure to 5.2.2 would solve the issue and allow NR to better deliver timetables in alignment with the information held in the documents.

A paper, HCPC_2697, entitled “Utilisation of 5.2.2” was then written as a result, which included a proposed way forward for Level Crossings, Firebreaks and General Capacity Constraints.

The process for Level Crossings, which is already in place and dealt with via TCRA, follows NR/L3/ANG/002 Level 3 - Anglia Route Work Instruction: Level crossing safety assessment of train plan variations.

TPR table contents

The table is self-explanatory, except for the final two columns.

- Barrier down time > 40 mins: any hour this occurs during the day is the mechanism for the crossing to be considered for inclusion onto the list the standard has a table (below) which explains this. Any crossing that falls within these criteria is then included on the red list.

Factor	High Risk Level Crossing - Inclusion Criteria
Current barrier down time compared against known road usage	Barrier down time >40 mins (67%) in the hour in any hour of the day**
Alternative platform to platform access at stations with level crossings	An alternative access e.g. footbridge is not present where pedestrians/passengers could be incentivised to misuse the crossing in order to catch their train
Potential for trains fouling crossings on the approach to a controlled signal and/or blocking sighting.	Crossing in close proximity to a controlled signal could lead to a train straddling the crossing while held at a 'stop' signal and/or train blocking sighting

The term “High Risk” is used in TPRs. ALCRM (All Level Crossing Risk Model) defines risk levels into high, medium, low risk – however NR Level Crossing risk assessments always add a qualitative element conducted by the Level Crossing Managers locally to define the risk at each level crossing that is not captured in the basic ALCRM tool.

Commentary on the Process and 5.2.2 Entry

Network Rail’s position is that this constitutes a rule. Where an Operator requests an increase in the current quantum of trains during the listed hours, that request triggers the requirement for an assessment. This assessment requirement is what gives the provision its effect as a rule, rather than procedural guidance.

How it works

The evidence which informs this section will come from TCRAg and LX risk teams.

Network Rail’s level crossing SMEs apply an established process to identify level crossing risk. This publication supports that process by helping to prevent additional or unmitigated train movements being added to the timetable without appropriate assessment, thereby reducing the risk of level crossings becoming further exposed.

The process is already established and in use. Network Rail will review timetable changes to identify whether there is a request to introduce an additional train movement over a high risk level crossing. Where this occurs, it will trigger an assessment by the level crossing safety team, who will determine whether the risk can be mitigated or whether the additional movement increases the level of risk at the crossing. The process will be managed jointly by the Timetable Production team and the level crossing safety team, with the affected Operator kept informed throughout.

Short Notice TPR Change

We can make a change to TPRs up until D26 – so if anything is identified during TCRAg we can make the change then, and trains can still be bid. The process will apply throughout the timetable production cycle for any additional change. Reviews will be undertaken at the TP-HAZID, TP-RAM and TP-RAP stages.

Network Rail is using Section 5.2.2 of the TPR document to publish the list of high-risk level crossings. Part D sets out the timescales for consulting on and publishing amendments to TPR values. A process map will link the High Risk list and TPRs to ensure they are updated hand-in-hand. Short Notice TPR change can be used to effect any changes where required,

The evidencing of the contents of the table will be via TCRAg and TCRAg log item outputs, and all assessments of LX are held on file by Route teams.

Specific detail

The expectation is that all relevant assessments will be concluded by the Offer stage, with the affected Operator kept informed throughout the process.

Yellow Planner Briefs will also be issued to address this topic.

This process of risk assessment is for actual running or intended running trains All trains included in the timetable and expected to operate will be assessed as part of the process

The exclusion of Y paths would be part of an assessment. The current process already makes provision for Y paths, which are counted as a single train slot

The process is already established and in use. The affected Operator will be advised of any expected timescales or delays if required.

In STP, while the risk still exists, it is reduced because the train slot is not repeated in the same way as in the Working Timetable. Alongside timetable assessment, Network Rail will review actual train running data to identify any further risks or emerging trends at individual level crossings.